Bureaucracy, Culture & Ft. Hood Attacks

Bureaucracy, Culture & Ft. Hood Attacks

The Fort Hood attack was an intelligence failure, just like 9/11 and so many others before. In retrospect, it all seems obvious – these kinds of failures always do. It is easy to blame bureaucratic inertia, but it is also unfair. Large organizations need procedures to function. Priorities must be set and decisions have to be made and implemented.

Examining the system failure is revealing, both about the challenges in preventing these kinds of tragedies but also in how they reveal some of our society’s core values.

Army: Major Problems
It is now clear that Major Hasan’s colleagues were concerned about his actions and behavior. But there were limits to what they could do about. Firing an Army Major is a very big deal. It is now clear that Hasan’s colleagues had doubts about his commitment to the military and about his work habits. But, informally, they judged that he was not dangerous. Consider the situation from their point of view. First, Hasan was a psychiatrist – it is understandable that Hasan’s colleagues would assume that an individual practicing a profession rooted caring, healing, and empathy would not be likely to become a murderer (Hannibal Lector is a fictional character.) But also consider the bureaucratic challenges. Hasan’s relatives reported that when Hasan made informal inquiries about leaving the Army:

They told him that he would be allowed out only if Rumsfeld himself O.K.’d it.

.This may be a slight exaggeration, but removing Hasan would certainly have required authorization from people several levels higher in the chain of command – and the bases for doing so were not evident. What was clear was that Hasan was odd and said disturbing things and that he did not appear devoted to the job and the Army. Virtually every bureaucracy ends up with at least a few such characters. Usually they are slowly eased out. To fire them, without clear evidence of criminal activity, is much harder. It would have taken enormous amounts of time and since Hassan was a Major, General officers would need to have been involved. There were obvious incentives for easing Hasan out, rather than attempting to dismiss him.

No doubt, Hasan’s colleagues are no wishing that they had pursued this process nonetheless and in the future officers faced with comparable situations undoubtedly will do whatever is necessary to remove individuals. But the organizational procedures that make it difficult to remove officers exist to protect them from the arbitrary whims of their superiors. This reflects our cultural belief in meritocracy over patronage and it is a value that has served us well.

FBI: By the Book
Hasan had also garnered the attention of the FBI-led Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF.) Here too, necessary organizational procedures failed to make the crucial connection. The FBI has to prioritize threats – the agency lacks the resources to track down every rumor and case of idle chatter (and an agency capable and mandated to do so would end up resembling STASI or the KGB.) This article from NPR’s All Things Considered gives some insight into the FBI’s criteria – the essence is “The closer the link to al-Qaida, the more serious the plot.” There are three levels, the people directly linked to al-Qaida (travel to Pakistan for training followed up by regular communications is seen as a big red flag.) The second level threats are plots linked to al-Qaida affiliates. The third level threats are the “angry young men” that are often radicalized on the Internet. Hasan would have been a “level three” except that he was a bit older then the usual recruits and his exchanges with radical cleric Anwar al-Aulaqi did not appear to be terribly angry. The FBI determined that he was not a threat.

The fact that the JTTF became aware of Hassan’s email exchange indicates what an enormous volume of material they are required to analyze. Priorities have to be set. Had the analysts gone one step further and spoken to Hasan’s colleagues there is a chance that the dots would have been connected. But the JTTF’s judgment was not an irrational one. Future instances of military personnel corresponding with radical Islamists will undoubtedly be bright red flags in the future. Organizations (like Generals) always prepare for the last crisis. Just as a 9/11-type plot will probably not be successful in the future, it is probable that the appropriate agencies will be able to head off tragedies like the Fort Hood murders in the future.

The question of what is next remains.

Lashkar-e-Taiba - Pakistan's Hezbollah

One group absent from the concoction of Punjabi groups joining the Pashtun Taliban rebellion is Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT). Although it recruits from the same general area, the other groups are Deobandi (Pakistan’s homegrown Islamic extremists) whereas LeT is Dar Ahl Hadith, which is basically the Pakistani-offshoot of the Saudi Wahabis. The theological divisions are not enormous and there are links. But LeT appears to be more careful and disciplined in its strategic thinking. It has not been involved in significant violence within Pakistan and has not taken on the Pakistani government. It also appears to have independent funding sources (initial stake money was apparently from Saudi Arabia, but it has since developed its own fund-raising networks.) While there are far fewer Ahl Hadith adherents in Pakistan then Deobandis (or Barelvis or Shia), LeT itself is one of the larger groups – the ISI reports they have 150,000 members. LeT runs schools, hospitals, and other social services along with an extensive print media empire. In short, it is a Hezbollah-like organization with multiple facets, the ability to innovate tactically, and choose its operations strategically (like the November 2008 attacks in Mumbai.)

Saeed Stands Alone
This is important background to the recent Pakistani court decision to dismiss incitement charges against LeT leader Hafiz Mohammed Saeed. B. Raman has a fine analysis here. A few additional points are in order. Westerners love the independent Pakistani judiciary when it is “democratic” but not when it is actually doing its job under the law. The real issue is the way in which Saeed was prosecuted. The charges were incitement – these are loser charges that only make Saeed more popular. Incitement against India is in theory illegal – but is also admired by many in Pakistan.

Saeed is officially head of Jamaat-ud-Dawa, which officially has nothing to do with LeT (see previous post.) One imagines evidence could be produced to prove this lack of connection false – but the Pakistani government does not seem interested in producing it. At this point, Pakistan cannot afford to open up a second front against the LeT – not with serious shooting in Wazirstan and the likelihood that operations in the Punjabi heartland will be necessary. The Pakistani army faces several challenges, first every unit deployed is a unit not facing India (the military’s core obsession), second the military is not designed for counter-insurgency operations, third much of the Pakistani army is Punjabi so operations there are fraught with potential morale problems.

It is unknown if the Pakistani high command views LeT as an asset or a problem, but given all of their immediate problems and the LeT’s scrupulous avoidance of taking on the Pakistani government it is easy to see why Pakistani leaders would avoid this particular fight.

They will not be able to avoid it forever.

Pakistan's Jihadi Stew

The aftermath of the attack on the Pakistani military’s GHQ earlier this week has brought attention to the complex stew of jihadi groups running around the Punjab. Imtiaz Gul provides an overview at Foreign Policy while the venerable B. Raman provides another at Outlook India. The story starts with the Saudis supporting anti-Shia groups in Pakistan to counter Iranian-backed Shia militancy. This was exacerbated by local animosities in regions were Pakistan’s Shia minority were wealthy landowners. The main anti-Shia group was Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP). Reportedly it received substantial state support under General Zia who wanted to counter his political rivals. SSP became involved in politics and spun-off violent groups, most notably Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) in 1996. Supposedly there is no connection between the political SSP and the terrorist LeJ. This is an organizational maneuver that has been repeated endlessly in the Pakistani jihadi milieu. Supposedly, both of these groups have been banned – but banned groups in Pakistan never seem to disappear, they just change their names.

The anti-Shia groups also worked with the Pakistani government during the Afghan war, where they forged links with the Arab jihadis and the Afghans. When Pakistan began supporting jihadi groups to fight in Kashmir the anti-Shia groups were an entryway. An effective unraveling of the Kashmiri groups is an enormous task – a small piece of the picture can be seen here. Individuals often move between groups – either because the group is shifting identity because of too much international attention or just for better “career opportunities.” Jaish-e-Mohammed was founded after Harkat ul-Ansar official Maulana Masood Azhar was freed from Indian prison and found that he was a popular figure. So rather then rejoin his old outfit, now renamed Harkat ul-Mujahideen (after Harkat ul-Ansar became a banned terrorist organization) Azhar founded JeM. Azhar was a model jihadi entrepreneur, with the venture capital provided (reportedly) by the ISI.

Man vs. Mosquito: The Ultimate Insurgent

The past week I celebrated the Jewish holiday Sukkot. During this holiday, observant Jews “dwell” in their sukkah – a temporary structure. This “dwelling,” depending on climate and inclination can vary from formally living in it to merely taking some meals in the sukkah. Personally I like to spend as much time in it as possible. One side effect is that our back door is open a lot and mosquitos get in our house. My wife does not like mosquitos (but they love her), so I sat up one night and tried to hunt down the ones that got into our house. Not easy. Fast and hard to spot, my most effective anti-mosquito tactic was to sit very still and let them get a taste of my arm. A draining, tedious strategy, and in the process I got bored and had a few beers which only reduced my effectiveness. If I had had to deal with more than a handful I would have had to turn to chemical warfare.

The experience brought to mind the classic line from Robert Taber’s 1965 classic on counter-insurgency, The War of the Flea: Guerilla Warfare in Theory and Practice

Analogically, the guerilla fights the war of the flea, and his military enemy suffers the dog’s disadvantages: too much to defend;too small, ubiquitous, and agile an enemy to come to grips with. If the war continues long enough - this is the theory – the dog succumbs to exhaustion and anemia without ever having found anything on which to close its jaws or rake with its claws.

It was a humbling experience. I guess the one difference is that insurgents can be deterred and co-opted. Mosquitos are remorseless blood-sucking machines.

Quetta Front & the Baluchi Factor

As fighting in Afghanistan, particularly the south, intensifies U.S. policy-makers are beginning to shift their gaze to Afghanistan’s southern border with Pakistan and wondering if the northern regions of Baluchistan are – like the FATA on Afghanistan’s eastern border – serving as a Taliban haven. U.S. officials have even claimed that Taliban head Mullah Omar and his top leaders are living in Baluchistan’s capital Quetta.

This has, unsurprisingly, set off a spasm of denials in Pakistan along with the immediate conclusion in Pakistan that the U.S. was planning drone attacks in Quetta. Not helpful, in the context of American attempts to attach conditions to aid in the Kerry-Lugar bill.

Old News
Two points about this “new” front. First, Quetta should have been on the radar screen from the beginning – back in May 2003 The New York Times reported on Taliban gathering in Quetta. The reporter Carlotta Gall and her Pakistani photographer Akhtar Soomro were beaten up by Pakistani intelligence agents for their trouble.

Pakistan’s Other Insurgency
The second point is that most of the articles speculating about the Taliban leadership residing in Quetta ignore the ongoing Baluchi insurgency in the province. This is not an irrelevant point. The northern part of Baluchistan is dominated by Pashtuns the tribe that spreads across much of Afghanistan and into the NWFP and FATA. Quetta, the provincial capital, is primarily Pashtun but close to the Baluchi/Pashtun fault-line. The Baluchis have never particularly wanted to be a part of Pakistan. This interview with an underground Baluchi rebel leader gives some background as to the depth of Baluchi resentment against the “Punjabis” and the way their activities in Baluchistan are perceived. This article by a Pakistani journalist expands on these themes, arguing that Islamabad has systematically sought to exploit Baluchistan’s resources while not building physical or social infrastructure in the province that benefits its people. Most interesting, he argues that Islamabad sought to play the Pashtuns against the Baluchis and encouraged Islamist Pashtun groups as a bulwark against Baluchi seperatists.

As discussed on this blog before, Pakistan is rife with ethnic cleavages which complicate its counter-terror and development. The Pakistani army turned against the tribal Pashtuns when they became a clear threat to the state – coming down from their mountain strongholds and into the “settled regions.” But the Baluchistan Pashtuns may still be viewed as an asset, balancing the Baluchi separatists and providing a needed line into the Taliban and Afghanistan should (as many Pakistani strategists expect) the U.S. quit the region.

Books could be written about this – there are no pat policy solutions. But if the U.S. hopes to work with Pakistan to clamp down on this southern haven and generally build a stronger and more stable Pakistan, it will need to consider the Baluchi factor and its impact on Pakistani thinking.

Safe for Now - Assessing Recent Terror Plots

Within the past week law enforcement has revealed the disruption of three separate terrorist plots against the United States. These actions highlight the continuing threat to the continental United States, but also the barriers discussed here before to conducting successful terrorist attacks within the United States.

Two of the plots were self-starters; individuals who became motivated to commit acts of violence and in their efforts to find allies inadvertently attracted the attention of law enforcement agencies. One had traveled to Pakistan where he may have received some training. All of them highlight the difficulties of carrying out a terrorist attack.

The two self-starters, in Texas and Illinois were both lured into law enforcement‘s clutches by promises of access to explosives. Weapons are frequently the lure that government informants use against suspected terrorists. This has also worked on the Fort Dix Six and against cells of right-wing domestic radicals in the past.

The case of Najibullah Zazi is a bit different. He had the wit to attempt to produce his own explosives, but that raises problems of a different sort. It appears that the process of acquiring the supplies and preparing the explosives left an extensive trail for law enforcement to follow. It is also appears that some intelligence agencies were interested in his activities beforehand, probably due to his travels to Pakistan, as his cel-phone was tapped.

These plots reinforce the reality that terrorist desire to strike the United States remains strong, but that their capabilities have been reduced. The abilities to move, communicate, and to acquire the skills and equipment needed to carryout terror attacks are limited and efforts to do so frequently tip-off law enforcement.

Tools to address the desire end of the equation still need to be developed. Nor can the current apparent limits on terrorist capabilities be taken for granted. These threats have been neutralized due to diligent efforts by American intelligence and law enforcement agencies. Terrorists can continue to turn to other countries with less capable security forces. There may be flaws in the U.S. security net that can exploited. Terrorists may “shorten their punch” by developing a lower-cost weapon of mass murder then previously deployed. None of these possibilities can be ignored.

Organizational Dynamics
In addition, it is possible (even probable) that baring successful attacks security agency emphasis on the problem will decline. In the classic case study, Essence of Decision, Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow explain how before the Challenger accident NASA officials had, based on previous shuttle launches modified the bases on which they made their decisions – ultimately following routine procedures in an unprecedented situation. But it should be emphasized that the routine procedures had served NASA well prior to the Challenger tragedy.

The same could happen on the counter-terror front. One hint of this potential is that the NYPD and the FBI seemed to have had crossed wires in the investigation (NYPD counter-terror officials have been reassigned.) The United States has innumerable law enforcement and intelligence agencies at the federal, state, and local level. The boundaries between their activities are not always clear. As memories of 9/11 fade the possibility of an incident slipping between these seams could increase – it is in the nature of large organizations with competing priorities.

Terrorists have been known to read indictments in terrorism cases for intelligence about what their enemies know about them. They can also consider how to take advantage of agency routines. The terrorist enemy is currently weak, but constantly adapting.

Why Hamas has been Quiet in 2009

The Jewish Policy Center's Palestinian Rocket Report has just published an article I wrote with my boss about why Hamas has kept the cease-fire since Operation Cast Lead. In it we to apply some of our work modeling terrorist group behavior, our models strongly suggest that internal Palestinian politics plays an important role in Hamas' strategic calculations.

The piece is below.

Why Hamas Has Been Quiet In 2009
by Aaron Mannes and V.S. Subrahmanian
Palestinian Rocket Report
September 15, 2009

Since Israel ended Operation Cast Lead―a massive incursion into the Gaza strip intended to suppress rocket fire into Israel―in January 2009, Hamas has largely held to a ceasefire on rocket and mortar attacks on Israel. The obvious explanation for this change in behavior is that Israel's incursion into Gaza and Hamas' corresponding heavy losses have re-established Israeli deterrence. Another explanation is that this unprecedented period of quiet is proof that Hamas has changed politically, and that Western nations and ultimately Israel should negotiate with it directly. There is also substantial countervailing evidence that HAMAS remains committed to its campaign against Israel and that the cease-fire is strictly tactical.

Models of organizational behavior built at the University of Maryland's Laboratory for Computational Cultural Dynamics suggest all of these explanations may be wrong. Indeed, intra-Palestinian politics may be playing an important yet overlooked role in Hamas' calculations.

Re-establishing Deterrance?

Hamas retains a significant capacity to strike Israel. Increased international efforts to close Hamas' supply line―the tunnels under the Egypt-Gaza border―have had limited success. The primary Hamas rocket, the Qassam, is easily produced. It is manufactured in the Gaza Strip using common materials such as metal pipes for the rocket body and fertilizer and sugar for fuel. Reports suggest that Hamas has acquired more sophisticated systems, such as longer-range rockets and anti-tank missiles, since the conclusion of Operation Cast Lead. Thus, despite maintaining the capability to continue launching rockets against Israel, Hamas has chosen not to do so.

However, Hamas' claims of victory in the wake of Operation Cast Lead rang hollow. Hamas inflicted minimal casualties on Israel and had difficulty sustaining rocket fire, while hundreds of Hamas fighters were killed or captured and substantial stores of equipment were destroyed. Though Hamas attempted to spin its survival as a victory, the reality was that Hamas' survival was due to Israel's decision to not re-occupy Gaza.

Moreover, Hamas chose to violate the 2008 cease-fire in an attempt to force Israel to end its blockade on shipping non-humanitarian goods into Gaza. Hamas failed to achieve this goal. The rocket provocations only led to a massive Israeli retaliation. Indeed, Hamas learned that large-scale rocket fire would only result in an overwhelming Israeli response.

In view of this analysis, it can be argued that Israel achieved deterrence. Yet, this is not a sufficient explanation for Hamas' behavior. Israel has struck Hamas hard in the past, killing its top leaders and destroying its infrastructure, yet Hamas continued to attack Israel.

Moderation vs. Pragmatism

Since agreeing to a new cease-fire, Hamas has launched an international public relations effort, including granting interviews with its leaders to Western journalists in which they discuss the conditions for a long-term ceasefire with Israel, and offering to engage with United States on the subject of Middle East peace. This has led some to argue that Hamas has changed some of its fundamental position.

Many analyses (including a monograph from the U.S. Army's Strategic Studies Institute) argue that viewing Hamas as a terrorist organization is too narrow a prism. HAMAS, they argue, is a complex political organization that provides social services, acts pragmatically and responsibly, and cannot be ignored because of its popular support among the Palestinians. Hamas leaders' recent statements are taken as evidence of the organization's pragmatism and an argument for the United States and Israel to directly engage Hamas.

However, as a study by the Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center shows, these statements are far from promises. The Hamas leadership delivers one message to the West, while making vitriolic statements to Arab audiences about Israel.

Hamas' raw anti-Semitic vitriol is impossible to ignore. For example, in April, during a festival in memory of Hamas' founder Ahmad Yassin, Hamas' television station aired a drama depicting Jews drinking the blood of Muslims. The website of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades continued to vilify Israel and lionize its "martyrs." Thus, even if Hamas leaders are prepared for a new understanding with Israel, they have done nothing to prepare the rank and file of their organization or the Palestinian people for real peace.

Military Capacity

Internal Palestinian politics may be a critical factor in Hamas' strategic calculations. The Laboratory for Computational Cultural Dynamics (LCCD) at the University of Maryland has developed Stochastic Opponent Modeling Agents (SOMA), which can automatically generate rules about the probability of an organization's behavior in a given situation. Hamas was among the profiled groups.

The model uses the Minorities at Risk Organization Behavior data set created at the University of Maryland's Center for International Development and Conflict Management. The data collected covers Hamas from its 1987 founding through 2004.

The model indicates that the primary driver for Palestinian attacks on Israel does not relate to specific events (reactions to provocations, as Hamas often claims), but Hamas' strength and military capacity.

For example, Hamas' probability of committing suicide bombings rose as the organization established external bases where it could learn from Iran and Hezbollah. Prior to the creation of these facilities, suicide bombings were not a Hamas tactic. Indeed, once Hamas had these bombers at their disposal, they dispatched them regularly, regardless of other factors.

When Hamas was engaged in the Palestinian political process (either running in elections or allowing its representatives to participate in the Palestinian Parliament) there remained a very high likelihood of Hamas suicide bombings as well as other acts of violence. This undermines the argument that participating in the democratic process has moderated Hamas.

Intra-Palestinian Politics

Not surprisingly, there is also a high correlation between Hamas violence (particularly assassinations, kidnappings, and arson attacks) during periods of conflicts with other Palestinian factions such as Fatah, its chief political rival.

In the past Hamas was at a decided disadvantage in its rivalry with Fatah. When it could not attack Fatah directly, Hamas could bolster its popularity by attacking Israel. Now that Hamas has complete control over the Gaza Strip and has emerged as both a military and political challenger to Fatah, it has to change its strategy and tactics. Indeed, Hamas now has more complex political factors to consider.

Rocket fire against Israel would only increase Hamas' international isolation, enforce the notion that sanctions against Gaza are necessary, and lend further impetus to American and Israeli support for Fatah against Hamas in the West Bank. This would weaken the organization amidst its current drive to supplant Fatah as the representative of the Palestinians and consolidate power after a 2006 electoral victory and its 2007 military coup in Gaza.

In other words, the decision to halt the firing of rockets from Gaza is not an abandonment of its long-term strategy of war against Israel. It is merely an element within its short-term strategy to consolidate power among the Palestinians. As Shin Bet (Israeli Security Agency) chief Yuval Diskin recently noted, the recent trail off in rocket fire, "doesn't mean they [Hamas] have abandoned ideological principles. Hamas is turning to the diplomatic sphere to challenge exclusive control by [Fatah leader] Abu Mazen."

History As A Guide

It would be overly optimistic to interpret Hamas' cease-fire since Operation Cast Lead as an indication of a philosophical change. The ineffectiveness of Hamas' rocket attacks relative to the damage it suffered from the IDF offensive must be one factor in Hamas' decision-making. Intra-Palestinian politics is another. Ultimately, short-term choices that impact Palestinian political dynamics will not likely prompt Hamas to renounce its goal of destroying Israel, or its long-term use of violence to achieve that end.

Aaron Mannes is a researcher at the University of Maryland's Laboratory for Computational Cultural Dynamics.V.S. Subrahmanian is the director.